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Whereas hedonic consumption is often labeled as impulsive, ﬁndings from self-licensing
research suggest that people sometimes rely on reasons to justify hedonic consumption.
Although the concept of self-licensing assumes the involvement of reasoning processes,
this has not been demonstrated explicitly.Two studies investigated whether people indeed
rely on reasons to allow themselves a guilty pleasure. Participants were exposed to a food
temptation after which passive and active reasoningwas assessed by asking participants to
indicate the justiﬁcations that applied to them for indulging in that temptation (Study 1) or
having them construe reasons to consume the hedonic product (Study 2). Regression
analyses indicated that higher levels of temptation predicted the number of reasons
employed and construed to justify consumption. By providing evidence for the involvement
of reasoning processes, these ﬁndings support the assumption of self-licensing theory
that temptations not only exert their inﬂuence by making us more impulsive, but can also
facilitate gratiﬁcation by triggering deliberative reasoning processes.
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INTRODUCTION
Many modern day health problems such as obesity, Type 2 dia-
betes, cardiovascular diseases, hypertension, and certain forms
of cancer originate from hedonic overconsumption, that is, the
consumption of appetitive but unhealthy products such as nico-
tine, alcohol, and fatty or sweet snacks. As such, hedonic products
tend to invoke conﬂict in most people: appealing to our indul-
gent inclinations while simultaneously signaling a breach of our
long-term goals (e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Wertenbroch, 1998). Thus,
people may inherently be more inclined to pursue the hedonic
option, yet will only do so when the situation allows them to
justify the violation of personal standards or goals (Kivetz and
Simonson, 2002; Khan and Dhar, 2006; Kivetz and Zheng, 2006).
Consequently, people are motivated to ﬁnd reasons that justify
abandoning their self-set rules and goals. As such, confrontation
with tempting hedonic products may not solely elicit impulsive
actions as is conceptualized in many models of self-regulation
but may also elicit reasoning processes. Such self-licensing, or the
tendency to rely on reasons and arguments to justify indulgence,
challenges the dual-process view dominating the self-regulation
literature. These so-called dual-process models of self-regulation
(e.g., Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Strack and Deutsch, 2004)
describe temptations as hot, impulsive and automatic forces that
need to be counteracted by rational and controlled processes, such
as reasoning (DeWittHuberts et al., 2014). Although self-licensing
assumes the involvement of reasoning processes, this has not yet
been demonstrated explicitly. The aim of the current paper is
therefore to establish whether people indeed deliberate to allow
themselves an otherwise guilty pleasure, thereby providing evi-
dence for the involvement of reasoning processes in indulgent
behavior.
SELF-LICENSING
The concept of self-licensing is based on ﬁndings from decision-
making research that people are more likely to make a choice
that can easily be justiﬁed (Shaﬁr et al., 1993). As the need to
choose often creates conﬂict, decision makers seek and construct
reasons in order to resolve the conﬂict and justify their choice
(e.g., Simonson, 1989; Shaﬁr et al., 1993; Kivetz, 1999). When
confronted with a typical self-regulation dilemma of gratifying
immediate desires versus the pursuit of long term beneﬁts, people
will in many cases be inclined to pursue the hedonic option, but
will be less likely to do so when the situation makes it difﬁcult for
them to justify it (Kivetz, 1999; Okada, 2005). Thus, sometimes
indulgence is not determined by ones’ capacity to control oneself,
but rather by the availability of reasons that one has to justify the
prospective indulgence (e.g., De Witt Huberts et al., 2014).
Self-licensing processes in self-regulation have been afforded
some attention in the domain of moral behavior, where peo-
ple whose past behavior (e.g., acting non-prejudiced) provides
them with some kind of moral credentials that license them to
subsequently behave in a way that violates these principles (e.g.,
voicing prejudiced opinions; Monin and Miller, 2001; Effron and
Monin, 2010). In recent years the empirical evidence accumulated
indicates that self-licensing processes also contribute to indulgent
behavior, demonstrating that providing people with a justiﬁca-
tion, such as effort (Kivetz and Zheng, 2006), achievement (Mick
and Faure, 1998; Kivetz and Zheng, 2006), altruism (Khan and
Dhar, 2006), or prior restraint (Mukhopadhyay and Johar, 2009)
leads to a preference for hedonic over functional choice (e.g.,
Khan and Dhar, 2006; Kivetz and Zheng, 2006) as well as hedo-
nic overconsumption (De Witt Huberts et al., 2012; Taylor et al.,
2014). For example, participants who were under the impression
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of having exerted more effort consumed more hedonic snacks
compared to participants believing their equally exerted effort
did not exceed the norm (De Witt Huberts et al., 2012). On a
more indirect level, a study on compensatory beliefs found that
compensatory intentions (“I eat this cookie now, but I cut back
later”) – which could be seen as a sort of justiﬁcation – are asso-
ciated with the decision to indulge amongst dieters (Kronick and
Knäuper, 2010).
While these studies provide evidence for the importance of
reasons in indulgent behavior, the assumed justiﬁcation pro-
cesses in these studies have not been demonstrated explicitly. In
studies investigating self-licensing processes, the backbone of the
process – seeking and constructing reasons to justify prospective
indulgent behavior – has remained implicit. For instance, in the
aforementioned studies participants were provided with, rather
thanhaving to construct a reason that justiﬁed subsequent hedonic
consumption. What’s more, the provided justiﬁcations remained
implicit, for example by making participants think they did a cer-
tain task twice rather than explicitly alluding to the extra effort
they exerted (De Witt Huberts et al., 2012), or by presenting the
licensing cue and consumption as being unrelated in two separate
tasks (e.g., Kivetz and Zheng, 2006; Mukhopadhyay and Johar,
2009). It has even been illustrated that self-licensing processes can
occur by relying on some kind of heuristic (i.e., “I deserve a treat
after effort”) or without awareness (e.g., Khan and Dhar, 2006;
Kivetz and Zheng, 2006).
Whilst these studies convincingly demonstrate how engrained
self-licensing is in our behavioral repertoire, seemingly relying on
heuristics and learned automatic associations, to our knowledge
it has not yet been demonstrated whether being confronted with
a temptation can indeed induce seeking and construction of jus-
tiﬁcations, thereby tempering the assumption that self-licensing
is a reasoned process. To date, only two studies have attempted
to explicitly capture the reasoning processes involved in justify-
ing indulgence (Khan and Dhar, 2006; Mukhopadhyay and Johar,
2009), yielding mixed results: one study ﬁnding that the justiﬁca-
tions people put forward mediated the relationship between prior
restraint and indulgent choice (Mukhopadhyay and Johar, 2009;
Study 1) while another study found that people were not aware of
applying justiﬁcations to indulge (Khan and Dhar, 2006; Study 2).
More importantly, besides these contradicting results, both stud-
ies inquired into the use of justiﬁcations after the indulgence had
taken place, thereby hindering conclusions about a priori delibera-
tion processes that would facilitate gratiﬁcation, and leaving open
the possibility that participants were applying a justiﬁcation in
hindsight as dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957) or reporting
a general belief that indulgent behaviors need to be justiﬁed (Xu
and Schwarz, 2009).
This lack of explicit evidence for the justiﬁcation process
is surprising, not only as introspection tells us that we some-
times actively seek and construct reasons when confronted with a
tempting choice (e.g., Mick and DeMoss, 1990). But also, and
more importantly, the very process of self-licensing, applying
a reason that justiﬁes a departure from one’s long term goals,
suggests that there must be some active argumentation involved
that fosters such a strategic decision. The aim of the current
paper is therefore to ascertain justiﬁcation processes explicitly,
thereby providing credence to the observation that deliberative
and reﬂective processes can facilitate indulgent behavior.
To investigate this, we provided weight-conscious participants
with an attractive but goal-threatening product, a chocolate bar,
and measured passive as well as active engagement in reasoning
behavior. We hypothesized that when the lure of the temptation,
and thus the need for justiﬁcation, is larger, the more likely people
are to engage in justiﬁcation processes. More speciﬁcally, we pre-
dict that the more one is tempted by the ‘forbidden’ product, the
more reasons one will employ to justify subsequent consumption
(Study 1). Moreover, we predict that exposure to a temptation will
not only stimulate employment of reasons available, but will lead
to active construction of justiﬁcations (Study 2).
STUDY 1
METHOD
Participants
Sixty female university students participated in this study for
course credit or 4€. Female participants were recruited as they
experience food more as a self-regulatory dilemma than males
(Grogan et al., 1997). This makes them more likely to use justiﬁ-
cations for indulging in highly caloric food. This assumption was
corroborated by the ﬁnding that all participants responded pos-
itively to the question: “Are you currently watching you weight?”
One participant who was an outlier (SD > 3) on the indepen-
dent variable (i.e., Temptingness of the hedonic product) and one
who did not comply with the instructions were removed result-
ing in a ﬁnal sample of 58 participants with a mean age of 20.21
(SD = 2.02).
Ethics statement. The study was conducted in accordance with
the ethical standards described by the Medical Research Involving
Human Subjects Act (WMO, 2012). This Act exempts research
on healthy human subjects from review for as long as it does not
involve any invasion of participants’ integrity. Consequently, no
formal ethical approval was required according to Dutch national
standards. Written consent was required from each participant
prior to participation.
PROCEDURE
The study was presented as a marketing study for a large retail
concern conducted by the university’s business school. The partic-
ipants were seated behind a table with the hedonic snack product
(a luxurious chocolate bar) that remained covered until partici-
pants were instructed to remove the cover to evaluate the product.
The goal and purpose of the study were presented in a booklet,
explaining that the producer, as part of the market introduction
of a new product, was interested in the evaluation of this prod-
uct by the target group of students aged 18–30. The participants
had to indicate how tempting they found the snack, among other
ﬁller items assessing the attractiveness and their willingness to try
the product. After completing this part of the evaluation, the par-
ticipants then read instructions that the snack was intended as an
indulgence and that, as information for the marketing strategy, the
producers wanted to know when and for what reasons the target
group would allow themselves this particular hedonic snack. On
a subsequent page the participants could indicate the reasons for
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having this product that applied to them out of a list of random
reasons. It was explicitly alluded that they could tick of as little or
many reasons as long as they applied to them. Finally, demographic
variables were asked before participants were debriefed and reim-
bursed for participation. A suspicion probe asking participants
to write down what they thought the purpose of the study was,
revealed that the cover story had been successful and that none of
the participants had been aware of the real question under study.
MATERIALS
Hedonic product
In line with the cover story the temptation consisted of a recently
launched luxurious chocolate bar by a well known brand.
Temptingness
Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they perceived
the product as tempting on a seven point Likert scale ranging from
1 (not at all) to 7 (verymuch). This itemwas presented among ﬁller
items assessing how likely they were to buy the product, how much
they were willing to pay for the product, and how willing they were
to try the product.
Hunger
As food consumption is largely determinedbyhunger andappetite,
participants had to indicate their levels of hunger and appetite on
seven point Likert scales (1 not at all to 7 a lot) that were combined
into a single measure of Hunger, (Cronbach’s α= 0.88) to control
for the effect of hunger on the temptingness of the product.
Justiﬁcations
As an explicit measure of the justiﬁcation processes involved in
self-licensing, participants could indicate the reasons that applied
to them for indulging in the hedonic product out of a list 30
reasons. The list of justiﬁcations consisted of variations of well-
known justiﬁcation cues such as effort (Kivetz and Zheng, 2006;
De Witt Huberts et al., 2012), achievement (Mick and DeMoss,
1990; Kivetz and Zheng, 2006), and altruism (Khan and Dhar,
2006). Examples of justiﬁcations are: “Because I have had a busy
period behind me”; “Because I have something to celebrate” and
“Because I feel bad today.” Visceral factors that may be used as
a reason to consume the product, such as appetite and hunger
were not included, as these factors physiologically determine food
intake and constitute a biological necessity to consume the hedonic
product, rather than a justiﬁcation. Participants were also pro-
vided with the opportunity to add a reason if they had a reason to
indulge that was not included in the list. The sum of justiﬁcations
was used as a measure of reasoning to indulge.
RESULTS
Descriptives
Table 1 shows themeans, SDs and intercorrelations of the variables
under study. Generally the participants rated the chocolate bar as
tempting (M = 5.88, SD = 0.73) with scores ranging from 3 to
7. Participants indicated on average 12.22 (SD = 6.64) reasons
to consume the hedonic chocolate bar. None of the participants
added a reason that was not yet included in the list. The most
frequently utilized reasons were: “I have something to celebrate”
Table 1 | Means, SDs, and Correlations (Study 1).
1 2 3
Hunger (1) –
Temptingness (2) 0.19 –
Number of justiﬁcations (3) 0.08 0.31∗ –
M 3.74 5.88 12.22
SD 1.49 0.73 6.64
*Signiﬁcant at p < 0.05 level.
(65%);“I have exerted effort for something important”(58%), and
“I deserve a reward”(56%).
Main analysis
A hierarchical regression analysis was performed to determine
whether temptingness predicted the number of justiﬁcations par-
ticipants employed to justify consumption. In the ﬁrst step hunger
was included as a control variable. In the second step temptingness
was entered as predictor. As can be seen in Table 2, the ﬁrst step
did not reach signiﬁcance, p = 0.54. In the second step tempting-
ness of the hedonic product signiﬁcantly predicted the number of
reasons, p = 0.02, explaining 9.7% of the variance (unadjusted).
The hypothesis that temptingness predicted the application of
justiﬁcations was therefore conﬁrmed.
DISCUSSION
The results of Study 1 conﬁrmed that subjective evaluation of
temptation strength predicts the employment of justiﬁcations.
These results suggest that reasoning processes that could facilitate
gratiﬁcation may already take place before prospective indulgence.
Whilst the current studies explicitly demonstrate the justiﬁcation
processes people employ when confronted with temptation, a lim-
itation is that participants were provided with justiﬁcation cues,
not allowing any conclusions about self-generated justiﬁcations
and thus actual active reasoning behavior in the face of tempta-
tion. This limitation was addressed in Study 2, thereby allowing
to more stringently test whether exposure to temptation indeed
elicits active reasoning processes.
STUDY 2
To investigate whether temptations elicit active engagement in
reasoning processes, Study 2 required participants to construe
Table 2 | Hierarchical multiple regression analysis for number of
justifications (Study 1).
Number of justifications
β F R2
Step 1 0.39 0.01
Hunger 0.08
Step 2 5.51∗ 0.09
Temptingness 0.31∗
*Signiﬁcant at p < 0.05 level.
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reasons to justify prospective indulgence. In addition, to provide
a more stringent test of our assumption that the hedonic prod-
uct represented a motivational conﬂict for our participants, we
only included female participants who indicated that the choco-
late temptation constituted a threat to their personally relevant
long-term goal (i.e., weight management).
Conform our hypothesis that temptations can encourage rea-
soning processes, we predict that higher levels of temptation
would be associated with a higher number of reasons construed to
consume the tempting threat.
METHOD
Participants
Thirty-seven female university students participated in this study
for course credit or 4€. Again only female participants were
recruited as they are more likely to perceive a chocolate bare as a
guilty pleasure (Grogan et al., 1997). This assumption was corrob-
orated during the study by including questions asking how much
importance the participants assigned to watching their weight and
how much the chocolate bar constituted a threat to their weight.
Only participants who assigned high importance to their weight
and found the product to be interfering with this goal (scoring>3
on both scales ranging from 1 to 7) were included in the ﬁnal anal-
yses. One participant who did not meet the criteria was excluded
from analyses, resulting in a sample of 36 students with a mean
age of 19.63 (SD = 4.07).
Ethics statement. See Study 1. All participants provided written
informed consent.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to the one employed in Study 1 except
that this time participants were asked to actively come up with
personally relevant reasons that would allow them to consume the
hedonic product. Afterward, together with ﬁller items such as fre-
quency of buying and consuming snacks, participants were asked
to indicate how relevant weightmanagement was to them and how
threatening they perceived the chocolate bar to be to this goal, to
ensure that licensing was indeed necessary. Finally, demographic
variables were asked before participants were debriefed and reim-
bursed for participation. A suspicion probe asking participants
to write down what they thought the purpose of the study was,
revealed that the cover story had been successful and that none of
the participants had been aware of the real question under study.
MATERIALS
Hedonic product
The tempting product was similar to the one used in Study 1.
Hunger. Again the mean scores of hunger and appetite were com-
bined into aHunger score (Cronbach’sα= 0.88) to serve as control
variable.
Temptingness
Participants had to indicate how tempting they perceived the prod-
uct to be on a seven point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to
7 (very much). This item was presented among ﬁller items assess-
ing how likely they were to buy the product and how much they
were willing to pay for the product.
Justiﬁcations
Instead of being provided with justiﬁcations, participants were
asked to write down the reasons they would have to consume
the tempting product. Similar to Study 1, participants read the
instruction that the retail concern was interested in the reasons
people have to eat an indulgent product and were given two exam-
ples of such reasons. The participants could then write down as
many or as little reasons as they could come up with to subse-
quently consume this product. Again it was emphasized that it
did not matter how many reasons they came up with, as long as
they were personally relevant. For similar reasons as in Study 1,
visceral reasons such as hunger or appetite were not included in
the ﬁnal score. The total number of reasons participants came up
with to consume the product was used as an indicator of reasoning
to indulge.
Goal relevance
To control for goal relevance, participants were asked to indicate
how important weight management was for them (“Do you watch
your weight?”) and how threatening they deemed the chocolate
product to be to their weight management goal (“How bad is the
product for maintaining your ideal weight”) on seven point Likert
scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
RESULTS
Descriptives
Table 3 shows themeans, SDs and intercorrelations of the variables
under study. 16.77% of the total amount of self-generated rea-
sons involved hunger or appetite (e.g., “because I have a chocolate
craving”;“because I’mhungry”) andwere not included in themea-
sure of justiﬁcation. The following analyses are thus based on the
remaining 83.23% of the self-generated reasons that actually con-
stituted justiﬁcations. Participants on average came up with 3.17
(SD = 2.55) justiﬁcations to consume the hedonic chocolate bar.
Examples of reasons are “After a day of studying hard”; “Because I
have ﬁnished/passed my midterms; “To make it a special evening
with my (boy)friend.” The mean score of temptingness was 5.55
(SD = 1.65), showing a wide variety of scores ranging from 1 (very
low) to 7 (very high). The participants attached a medium to high
importance to achieving and maintaining a healthy weight, 4.9
(SD = 1.14) and considered the chocolate product as interfering
Table 3 | Study 2: means, SDs, and Correlations (Study 2).
1 2 3 4 5
Hunger (1) –
Temptingness (2) 0.01 –
Number of justiﬁcations (3) 0.06 0.36∗ –
Weight watching importance (4) −0.27 0.29 0.31 –
Product bad for weight (5) −0.23 0.21 0.21 0.38∗ –
M 4.01 5.56 3.17 4.89 6.5
SD 1.60 1.65 2.55 1.14 0.65
*p < 0.05.
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with that goal with a mean score of 6.5 (SD = 0.65) on how bad for
weight management they perceived the chocolate product to be.
Main analysis
A hierarchical regression analysis was performed to determine
whether temptingness predicted the number of reasons partici-
pants constructed to justify consumption. In the ﬁrst step hunger
was included as control variable. In the second step temptingness
was entered as predictor. As can be seen in Table 4, the ﬁrst step
did not reach signiﬁcance, p = 0.75. In the second step, subjec-
tive temptingness of the hedonic product signiﬁcantly predicted
the number of reasons participant construed, p = 0.03, explaining
13.2% of the variance (unadjusted). Participants who were more
tempted by the chocolate product constructed more reasons to
indulge.
DISCUSSION
Study 2 demonstrated that when tempted, people actively con-
strue reasons and justiﬁcations to indulge in that guilty pleasure.
To our knowledge this study constitutes the ﬁrst demonstration of
actively engaging in justiﬁcation processes when confronted with
a self-regulation dilemma, lending further support to the concept
of self-licensing.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current studies established explicit self-licensing processes and
demonstrate that people not only apply justiﬁcations made avail-
able to them to indulge, but they also actively construe justiﬁca-
tions in the face of temptation, thereby suggesting that temptations
not only exert their power by eliciting impulsive reactions, but also
induce reasoning processes that may facilitate indulgent behavior.
These results challenge the prevalent idea that deliberation and
reﬂection always foster goal-directed behavior by allowing us to
overcome the stimulus control of temptations, as is suggested by
many dual-process models of self-regulation (e.g., Metcalfe and
Mischel, 1999; Strack and Deutsch, 2004). Instead, these ﬁnd-
ings indicate that temptations also can exert their inﬂuence via
the reﬂective or ‘cool’ system, suggesting that hedonic behavior
is not exclusively the result of impulsive processes. The current
results thus offer a novel point of view for the conceptualization
of hedonic behavior, that may have a familiar appeal to many
of us, yet is not incorporated in the main theories of hedo-
nic (over)consumption (e.g., Baumeister and Heatherton, 1996;
Table 4 | Hierarchical multiple regression analysis for number of
self-generated justifications (Study 2).
Number of justifications
β F R2
Step 1 0.11 0.00
Hunger 0.06
Step 2 4.88∗ 0.13
Temptingness 0.36∗
*Signiﬁcant at p < 0.05 level.
Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Strack and Deutsch, 2004). Future
research should incorporate previous ﬁndings on self-licensing
with the current evidence for explicit justiﬁcation processes, to
establish to what extent the observed reasoning processes can
stimulate actual indulgent behavior.
Despite this novel contribution, a few issues remain to be
explored. Firstly, no actual hedonic behavior was assessed, so it
is not clear to what extent the observed licensing processes trans-
late into actual indulgent consumption. As human behavior is
inﬂuenced by many factors simultaneously, it could very well be
that additional factors inhibit the premeditated indulgent behav-
ior ultimately. Nevertheless, prior research into self-licensing has
already demonstrated that even being provided with a single rea-
son can facilitate indulgent behavior, it thus seems likely that the
construction of justiﬁcations as is currently observed would pro-
duce similar effects. Relatedly, the current studies used the number
of reasons as a quantiﬁcation of justiﬁcation processes, it remains
to be seen, however, if the number of reasons is the crucial con-
nection between justiﬁcation and behavior. To discernwhether the
quantity, the quality, or an interaction between the two, is decisive
for the translation from justiﬁcation to indulgence is something
that should be explored in future studies. Even so, the current stud-
ies provide a valuable contribution to the concept that temptations
not only elicit impulsive automatic reactions, but also stimulate
reasoning processes.
A limitation of the current studies is that the justiﬁcations par-
ticipants had to give were hypothetical, that is, they had to indicate
what would be a justiﬁcation for them to consume that product,
but they did not have to justify actual consumption at thatmoment
itself. However, asking participants to justify consumption in situ,
might have elicited reactivity or eluded social desirable answers, as
justiﬁcations can have the negative connotation of being excuses
for one’s undesirable behavior, something people presumably do
not like to exhibit. Inquiring speciﬁcally after the justiﬁcations
people tend to use as part of a consumer study, thereby acknowl-
edging that it is a common process, probably allowed for a more
free and honest reﬂection of the justiﬁcations people apply. Simi-
larly, the current studies didnot establish spontaneous justiﬁcation
processes, but required the participants to come up with justiﬁ-
cations. We deem it quite difﬁcult, however, to establish explicit
self-licensing processes spontaneously, as again this would be bur-
denedby the inhibiting inﬂuence of social desirabilitywhenhaving
to explicitly name the justiﬁcations one uses. It seems more likely
that the self-licensing processes people rely on are intrapersonal in
their nature and take the form of self-talk or licensing thoughts,
rather than explicitly stating the justiﬁcation. The latter could
emphasize the sometimes inconsistent justiﬁcations people rely
on, thereby challenging their power. Nevertheless, even seeing a
strong effect of temptation strength on the justiﬁcations people
apply and construe when the prospective consumption is hypo-
thetical and under the social constraints posed by a lab study,
suggests that the effect may even be stronger in daily hedonic
behavior, where one mainly has to justify one’s goal-violating
behavior to oneself and not necessarily to others.
A second limitation is the cross-sectional nature of the cur-
rent ﬁndings. Temptation strength should be manipulated in
future studies to establish their causal role in the justiﬁcation
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process. This however, raises the question of how temptingness
could be manipulated adequately without eradicating the tempta-
tion strength altogether. Possibilities are manipulating temptation
strength itself (e.g., weak and strong temptations; Kroese et al.,
2011) or varying the degree of goal threat a temptation consti-
tutes. Despite the lack of causal inferences, the current studies
have the advantage that subjective temptation was assessed, thus
capturing the seductive power of the temptations more accurately,
as temptations tend to be idiosyncratically determined rather than
generally established; something that is also reﬂected by the vary-
ing ratings of temptingness in the present studies of a universally
acknowledged temptation such as chocolate.
A third limitation of the study is that both studies included a
relatively low number of participants with low statistical power
as a result. Before any ﬁrm conclusions can be drawn, replication
of the ﬁndings in larger samples is warranted. Replication should
also include participants fromnon-student community samples to
determine the extent towhich justiﬁcation processes are associated
with the typical characteristics of young and well educated people.
Despite the issues in need of further exploration, the ﬁnding
that self-licensing in fact involves reasoning processes brings new
light to the conventional conceptualization that indulgent behav-
ior is the result of impulsive processes, while reasoning processes
would support goal directed behavior. Not only do the current
results, together with prior ﬁndings on self-licensing, suggest
that reasoning processes can instigate hedonic behavior, they also
indicate that confrontation with temptation not always prompts
automatic reﬂexive behaviors. Although it has been demonstrated
that temptations not necessarily lead to gratiﬁcation, but that con-
frontation with temptation can also automatically reinstate ones’
long term goal (e.g., Fishbach et al., 2003; Kroese et al., 2009), these
ﬁndings demonstrate that temptations do not always elicit auto-
matic reactions, but can also induce reﬂective processes that could
contribute to indulgent behavior. Together these results suggest
that the line between‘hot’and‘cool’processes is not as clear-cut. By
uncovering alternative pathways to hedonic overconsumption, we
hope to contribute to a more comprehensive view of health behav-
ior that goes beyond the traditional divide between the passions
and reason.
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